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Abstract. Scientific understanding as a subject of inquiry has become widely discussed in philosophy of science
and is often addressed through case studies from history of science. Even though these historical reconstructions
engage with details  of  scientific  practice,  they usually provide  only limited  information about  the gradual
formation of understanding in  ongoing processes  of  model  and theory construction. Based on a qualitative
ethnographic study of  an ecological  research project,  this article  shifts  attention from understanding in the
context of historical case studies to evidence of current case studies. By taking de Regt's (2017) contextual
theory of scientific understanding into the field, it confirms core tenets of the contextual theory (e.g. the crucial
role of visualization and visualizability) suggesting a normative character with respect to scientific activities.
However, the case study also shows the limitations of de Regt's latest version of this theory as an attempt to
explain the development of understanding in current practice. This article provides a model representing the
emergence of scientific understanding that exposes main features of scientific understanding such as its gradual
formation, its relation to skills and imagination, and its capacity for knowledge selectivity. The ethnographic
evidence presented here supports  the claim that  something unique can be learned by looking into ongoing
research practices that can’t be gained by studying historical case studies.
Keywords: philosophy of  science in practice,  model  building,  visualization,  skills,  imagination, knowledge
selectivity.
1. Introduction
Explaining and understanding natural phenomena is the raison d’être of science (de Regt and Dieks 2005). In
early philosophy of science, the notion of understanding was routinely attributed to the notion of explanation
(i.e. knowledge)  (see  Kvanvig  2003;  Grimm  2006;  Pritchard;  2009,  2014).  More  recently,  the  notion  of
understanding has gained prominence in philosophy of science and has been taken into philosophy of science in
practice through the contextual theory of scientific understanding (de Regt, Leonelli and Eigner 2009; de Regt
2017). This article draws attention to the fact that much work in the philosophy of science remains insufficiently
connected to the details of scientific practice (Ankeny et al. 2011). Although there are recent works connecting
scientific understanding with ongoing research  practices (see Leonelli 2009); the majority of examples1 used
1 I would like to draw special attention to the fact that not all investigations concerning understanding are based
on historical case studies, there are increasingly investigations such as those provided by Leonelli (2009) that
provide an account of scientific understanding via modelling practices and skills in contemporary biological
2both in mainstream philosophy of science and philosophy of  science in practice come from historical  case
studies  that  provide  limited  information  on  the  gradual  formation  of  scientific  understanding  in  ongoing
processes  of model and theory construction.  Being historical,  they are reconstructions created according to
examples from the history of science.
A shift in focus may help shed light on the epistemic value of understanding in scientific practices while
improving epistemological discussions in philosophy of science regarding the nature of understanding and the
scientific activity of model-building. With this goal in mind, this investigation seeks to undertake this discussion
from a different angle; using a detailed ethnographic study, it examines a current ecological research practice
through the lens of de Regt's (2017) latest version of the contextual theory of scientific understanding. Such an
approach complements historically oriented case studies concerning debates around scientific understanding by
providing insights into the formation of  scientific  understanding.  Through modeling practices  (with special
emphasis on the role of visualization),  it  looks at  how understanding emerges and is achieved in real-time
research, and how understanding leads to knowledge of explanandum. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the research context and the methodological
aspects adopted in this investigation. Section 3 presents how the contextual theory of scientific understanding
structures, organizes and assesses scientific understanding. Important to highlight here that this investigation
does not tackle previous versions of the contextual theory (such as those presented in de Regt, Leonelli and
Eigner (2009) Scientific understanding: philosophical perspectives book), instead, this investigation assesses the
applicability of the contextual theory of scientific understanding as presented in de Regt's (2017) latest book
Understanding scientific understanding. Section 4 introduces a case study from ecology and analyzes how the
contextual theory can be applied to this ongoing scientific practice. Finally, Section 5 introduces a model that
enables discussion as to how scientific understanding emerged in this current ecological practice.
2. Research context and methodology:
Philosophers pursue historical  endorsement for their theories about science through the use of  case studies
(Bolinska and Martin 2019; Mizrahi forthcoming). The most prominent examples in debates regarding scientific
understanding are elaborated from historical cases and may be insufficient to assess scientific understanding in
ongoing scientific practices. In recent years,  the use of case studies has become widespread, with the more
apparent  practice-orientation  of  mainstream philosophy of  science  (Knuuttila  and  Loettgers  2016;  Mizrahi
forthcoming). In the aim of presenting a different approach, the contextual theory of scientific understanding is
applied to a current scientific practice in a biological context. The resulting investigation provides evidence for
philosophy of science debates through a qualitative, ethnographically oriented philosophical work. It does so by
accompanying  the  activities  of  an  ecologist  (occasionally  referred  to  as  scientists  or  modeler)  during  his
scientific  research:  the  development  of  a  mechanistic  model  of  pollination  in  agricultural  systems,  at  the
agricultural pole of Mucugê-Ibicoara, located in the Chapada Diamantina National Park, Brazil. 
The data gathered for this analysis (i.e. statements, diagrams, models, tables, graphs and reports) was
obtained through >45 meetings (with open interviews and questionnaires), which took place over a four-year
period. In the first year, I gathered together with the ecologist during monthly meetings to develop a heuristics
research. 
3set that would guide explanation construction and model building. This heuristics set was built in accordance
with ecological theories and the new mechanistic philosophy of science; the dynamics of this development is
depicted in Figure 1. Over the next few years, I stepped outside our mutual collaboration in order to evaluate
how the scientist applied the heuristics set to model the phenomenon as well as to assess his understanding (for
details on heuristics set application and mechanistic model development see Poliseli et al. forthcoming). 
Figure 1: Collaboration dynamics between philosopher and ecologist  to develop a heuristics set. The
general conception of the heuristics set was constructed by combining the knowledge from theories in ecology
and the new mechanistic philosophy of science. Its application was theoretically informed in the same way as its
theoretical framework was empirically informed (see Poliseli 2018). 
This case study sought to create a mechanistic model of this system and provide predictive scenarios. To
do so, the heuristics set was developed in order to guide model-building, including, for example, a description of
explanans and explanandum, an elaboration of mechanism sketches, identification of the systems conditions and
variables, recognition of hierarchical structures, and so on (some main heuristics and its goals are exposed in
Table 1). However, the goal of elaborating a mechanistic model was discarded during the research and replaced
with a goal that was more suitable for such a complex phenomenon: the development of a conceptual framework
that unifies mechanistic explanation, complex systems sciences and metacommunities theory (for details see
Coutinho 2018). Ultimately, since it relates to the final product of the scientist’s research project, the conceptual
framework per se was not the main focus of this investigation. Instead, the main focus was upon the activities
carried  out  prior  to  the  conceptual  framework,  in  other  words,  the elaboration  itself,  i.e. the  formation  of
understanding in an ongoing research practice. The analysis of scientist practices by the light of the contextual
theory of scientific understanding will be described in later sections.
Table 1: Heuristics set developed in interdisciplinary work engaging ecology and philosophy of 




The description of the phenomenon to be modeled and what will be 
considered in its explanation. 
Mechanism sketch Diagrams that aim to establish the relationship between the theoretical 
frameworks and the phenomena to be explained, whose purpose is to 
construct a model that can explain the phenomenon. The two most 
4important features of this sketch are its lack of information and its 
disposable nature. Any mechanism sketch possesses gaps, gray and black 
boxes, and may be discarded whenever necessary.
Hierarchical 
structure
A structure that seeks to identify and locate the [amount of] levels in 
which the mechanism (or mechanisms) are organized and nested in the 
phenomenon superstructure. This heuristics may enable visualizing the 




The goal is to distinguish the components and functions of the enabling 
conditions within the mechanism and specify the relations and 
boundaries between these components. If this information is not yet 
present in the theoretical literature, it is highly recommended that one 
carries out procedures of decomposition & localization, forward & 





The attempt to exploit alternative scenarios and predict possible courses of the
system under investigation by modifying the operational components.
Source: Poliseli (2018).
3. Scientific understanding
Early philosophers of science used to analyze the notion of understanding with the notion of explanation. One
way to do so was to assume understanding as an unproblematic counterpart of explanation, for instance, “one
understands  A if  and  only if  one  can  explain  A”.  An  independent  analysis  of  understanding  was  deemed
unnecessary because the theories of explanation were assumed to suffice for the discussion. Another way to do
so was to assume understanding as a psychological  dimension of explanation. As a psychological  concept,
understanding  was  not  considered  to  be  in  the  realms  of  philosophical  elucidation,  especially  because
philosophy was mainly interested in the rational and objective context of justification (Gijsbers 2013). 
Philosophers  of  science’s  interest  in  the  notion  of  understanding  developed  more  recently,  and  the
psychological dimensions of science, including notions such as the “feeling of understanding” and “grasp”, are
no longer viewed as being outside the boundaries of philosophy (Gijsbers 2013; Gopnik 1988). Consequently,
philosophers started to doubt the veracity of the proposition “one understands A iff one can explain A”, which
reflected  discussions  pertaining  to  the  existence  of  understanding  without  explanation  and,  inversely,
explanation without understanding (de Regt and Dieks 2005, Lipton 2009). This occurrence was the result of
philosophers’ diminishing aversion to recognizing science’s psychological dimension while conceding that the
differences  between explanation and understanding could also rely on non-psychological  features  (Gijsbers
2013).
Even though scientific understanding has received increased attention, its role in scientific practices has
only become recently addressed through accounts such as the contextual theory (de Regt and Dieks 2005; de
Regt,  Leonelli  and Eigner 2009; de Regt 2017).  In here,  I  will focus on the contextual  theory of scientific
understanding as presented in the book Understanding Scientific Understanding, where de Regt (2017) presents
a  general  theory  of  scientific  understanding  that  is  pluralistic  and  independent  of  any  specific  model  of
explanation, allowing understanding to be achieved via different explanatory strategies. This theory asserts that
to achieve scientific understanding, it is first necessary to understand the theories used to explain phenomena.
5Theories then must contain arguments that are intelligible for scientists to understand. In other words, “[o]nly
intelligible  theories  allow  scientists  to  construct  models  through  which  they  can  derive  explanations  of
phenomena on the basis of the relevant theory” (de Regt 2017, p. 92). It is important to highlight that de Regt’s
intelligibility requirement relies on the following Criterion for Understanding Phenomena (CUP):
CUP:  A phenomenon  P is  understood  scientifically  if  and  only  if  there  is  an
explanation of P that is based on an intelligible theory T and conforms to the basic
epistemic values of empirical adequacy and internal consistency (ibid).
The contextual  theory elaborates  on the idea of  variations in standards of intelligibility in scientific
practice, asserting that scientific understanding should account for the contemporary and historical practice of
science.  Nonetheless,  the  intelligibility  standards  do  not  claim  a  status  of  exclusiveness  and  immutability
because of  the importance of  changing contexts.  Therefore,  to achieve understanding is a  macro-level  aim
(considering science as a whole), even though a scientist's view at the precise moment when understanding is
achieved may be contextually situated at a meso- (e.g.  scientific communities) or micro-level (e.g. individual
scientists) (de Regt and Dieks 2005, p. 165).
Considering that one of science’s universal epistemic aims is to understand phenomena and that scientific
understanding requires intelligible theories, the contextual theory assumes intelligibility as a context-dependent
feature concerning theoretical virtues as well as scientists’ skills. Accordingly, scientists require intelligibility to
be able to use theories in order to generate explanations and predictions. From such a perspective, these authors
elaborate a Criterion for the Intelligibility of a Theory (CIT) that incorporates pragmatic and contextual features
of understanding:
CIT:  A  scientific  theory  T is  intelligible  for  scientists  if  they  can  recognize
qualitatively  characteristic  consequences  of  T without  performing  exact
calculations.
Therefore,  in  the  contextual  theory,  a  privileged  status  of  particular  standards  of  intelligibility (e.g.
causality or unifying power) as necessary conditions for understanding is not assumed. Instead, it’s argued that
such intelligibility standards function as contingent tools to achieve scientific understanding in that they help
scientists to intuitively discern the consequences of a scientific theory, thus fulfilling CIT requirements (de Regt
and Dieks 2005). Although the contextual theory presents a normative scope for understanding across sciences,
it  has  been  primarily  developed  through  examples  from  physics.  Furthermore,  the  contextual  theory  is
constructed using examples from the history of science. In other words, the scientific processes deployed in this
theory are historical reconstructions created originally from the products of science - which may misguide the
approximation of scientific understanding in ongoing practices. By adopting this theory, this paper is not only
investigating if de Regt (2017) contextual theory can be applied to an ongoing scientific practice of a biological
context, but is also inquiring if this theory is sufficient to explain the emergence of scientific understanding in
real-time scientific practice. 
64. Ecological research in practice: bees, mechanisms and frameworks
Bees  are  the  most  important  organisms  for  pollination  in  most  regions  of  the  globe  (Klein  et  al . 2007).
Worldwide,  they  are  responsible  for  the  pollination  of  approximately  70%  of  crops  more  than  80%  of
angiosperms.  These  groups  of  bees  are  usually  involved  in  different  ecological  processes,  such  as  water
depuration, nutrient cycling, and the control of biological pests and pollination (Schleuning et al. 2015). All
these ecological processes, namely ecosystem services, are intimately connected with agricultural food supplies
for human societies and other biological communities. 
In terms of their dynamics, agricultural systems are defined by an intricate set of ecological and non-
ecological  characteristics.  For  instance,  policies  for  landscape  management  that  aim  to  suppress  native
vegetation  may  negatively  affect  several  groups  of  pollinator  species  (Boscolo  et  al. 2017).  Despite  the
importance, medium and long-term forecasts predict that intensive land use is not consistent with the stability of
agricultural systems through time. In order to maintain ecosystem stability, land use will need to be restructured
in a manner that is compatiblewith the conservation of biodiversity and ecosystem services. As a consequence, a
connection exists between conservation and ecosystem services proposed via functional diversity of ecosystems
services providers.  The adoption of such a notion stems from distinct species’ unequal contributions to the
stability of ecological functions related to ecosystem services (Coutinho  2018). Taking this into account, the
ecological  phenomenon  was  defined  by  the  scientist  as  the  functional  composition  of  autochthonous  bee
communities  in  agriculture  systems,  i.e. investigate  how  native  bee  communitiesorganize  themselves  in
agricultural systems, concerning their functional roles such as pollination.
7Figure 2:  mechanism sketch developed by the scientist  to represent  the ecological  phenomenon and derive
forecasts for bee-plant interaction (explanation vide text) (designed by Diogo Lula Amorim). Source Coutinho
(2018).
In an agricultural system such as the aformentioned example, the patch interconnection (i.e. vegetation
fragmentation) is anelement that enables higher levels to function as a mechanism. A landscape may possess
several  heterogeneous  patches,  from native  and  secondary  vegetation  to  agricultural  fields.  Each  of  these
patches has various dynamics and impacts differently on the pollination system, which in turn grants uniqueness
in terms of the bee-flower interaction's dynamics (Figure 2). In a top-down view, this mechanism recognizes a
four-level hierarchy. Although neither the elements nor the activities are established, it is still possible to identify
different forecasts (or expected behaviors) for levels related to the bees’ features. For instance, at the smallest
level (forecast 3) the diversity of small bees works as functional complement to the diversity of larger bees
moving between the patch fragments that are interconnected at the mesoscale. At forecast 2, the distance of the
fragment  influences  pollinators’ movements:  the  shorter  the  distance  between the fragments,  the larger  the
dispersion of the pollinators amid the landscape. Meanwhile, in terms of habitat diversity, the more diverse the
habitats, the larger the floral resources at the small  scale. The management stability of a viable population of
pollinators and the ecosystem service they provide, needs a synchronism between plant flowering and animal
presence. For pollen gathering (dotted gray box) there must be synchronism between phenology and foraging;
otherwise, there is no possibility of gathering. If the synchronism is positive, then the encounter between flower
8and pollinator will happen through behavioral displays and structural features (Figure 2, Notes 1-3) that enable
recognition and interactions. 
This case study in ecology addressed the most relevant ecological processes in an attempt to explain the
functional diversity of bees in agricultural systems. To do so, these agricultural systems were re-evaluated from
a complex systems perspective (see Solé and Gooldwin 2000; Boccara 2004; Mitchel 2009; Cadotte et al. 2011;
Filotas et al. 2014), complemented by the theoretical-methodological framework of mechanistic explanation. To
explain this phenomenon, a study of the literature highlighted the most relevant spatio-temporal scales. Since the
forms of interaction between these variables are not always clear in ecology, it’s important to arrive at a more
satisfactory level  of explanation, by reducing existing gaps,  looking for intersections between theories  and,
considering spatial and environmental features along with attributes of the chosen phenomenon’s life history
(Scientist,  personal  communication).  The analysis  of  the scientist’s  practices  by the light  of  the contextual
theory of scientific understanding will be described bellow.
4.1. Contextual theory and conceptual tools in ecological practice
The core idea of de Regt's contextual theory revolves around intelligibility2: “Intelligibility [is] the value that
scientists attribute to the cluster of qualities of a theory (in one or more of its representations) that facilitate the
use of the theory” (de Regt 2017, p. 40). Thus, a theory may be intelligible in different ways and this is only
possible because theories are historically content- and context-dependent. Therefore, some tools allow a theory
to be more intelligible than others, consequently, facilitating scientists’ understanding. Included among these
tools are visualization, causal reasoning, visualizability, unificationist notions, and mathematical index. Their
adequacy with respect to the scientific practice of this case study will be depicted below.
Using visualization as a tool for understanding is a common practice in the history of science. According
to Machamer et al. (2000) and de Regt (2017), seeing is the most important way for humans to perceive the
world, which can be attributed to our ontogenetic and phylogenetic development. It is thus understandable that
scientists are inclined to use visualization as a tool for scientific understanding, once our sensory experience
provides bases for intelligibility which are then extended to realms beyond sense perception (de Regt 2017, pp.
257-258). It is important to highlight that visualization is a possible tool for achieving understanding, however it
is  not  a  necessary  condition.  As  such,  in  a  (not  so)  hypothetical  situation,  a  scientist  with  limited  visual
capability is also able to gain understanding.
According  to  Bechtel  and  Abrahamsen  (2005),  diagrams  of  complex  mechanisms  are  preferred  to
theoretical representations because they can inform the spatial organization of mechanisms, making them easier
to track. The contextual theory (de Regt 2017, p. 258) adds that this does not mean that diagrammatic reasoning
can be applied easily and immediately. As perceived in the following statement of the scientist3, this is not an
easy task. At the same time that each attempt to develop a mechanism sketch helped the scientist with solutions,
it also helped to perceive gaps regarding the scientific literature underlying the system. This outcome reveals the
2The contextual theory of understanding makes no difference between theories, hypothesis, and principles. The 
starting point is that all of them are statements, and these statements can be reliable according to its 
intelligibility (de Regt 2017). This is in agreement with Giere (2004) when he says that there is no reason for 
such analysis because the terms ‘theory’, ‘laws’ and ‘principles are used broadly in scientific practice and in 
metalevel discussions about sciences.
3 The statements exposed are authorized.
9challenges  in  building  diagrammatic  representations  of  complex  systems  and,  based  on  this  ethnographic
evidence, underscores the persistent attempts required to develop mechanisms sketches that allowed to gradually
grasp the phenomenon.
In the first proposition of the "mechanism sketch" I realized that I could not arrive
at a minimally reasonable scheme of communication of my phenomenon and of the
relevant  variables  for  such.  […].  With  each  new  sketch,  new  challenges,  and
solutions, two dimensions of the process of construction of scientific knowledge
that led me to lead a process of full immersion in the scientific literature to address
the gaps that were gradually perceived. [SCIENTIST, personal communication]
In the case study, the epistemic value visualization for model building was widely perceived  throughout
the  scientist’s  activity.  One  activity  that  deserves  attention  was  the  development  of  mechanism  sketches,
examples of  its wide application are presented in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Five examples from the >21 sketches, diagrams and mechanisms developed by the ecologist during his
research. Hierarchical model elaborated with 4-level structure and subsequent mechanisms of each level. 1*
mechanisms of the regional scale. 2* mechanism of the landscape scale. 3* mechanism of the patch scale. 4*
mechanism of the flower scale. All of them heuristics-based and further discarded. Source Poliseli (2018).
Recognizing the amount of diagrams created by the scientist, one cannot deny the important role they had
for the model’s development and the construction of an explanation, seeing that biologists intervene on models
in order to reach explanations of the phenomenon in question (Leonelli 2009). In this sense, this agrees and
confirms that models work as objectual tools to improve theories (Morgan and Morrison 1999; Knuuttila and
Merts  2009).  In  this specific  case study,  visualizability had a fundamental  role for scientific understanding
through model construction, even though this role was provisional when compared to the final framework put
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forward by the modeler. The power of this conceptual tool is further confirmed by the modeler with respect to
the precise shape of the mechanism:
 
In wider theoretical models, the general format of the mechanism, when dealing
with  a  more  complex  structure,  [also]  contributes.  […]  The  definition  of  the
typology is crucial in understanding the magnitude that certain processes may have
in generating patterns of bee functional diversity. This heuristics pointed to a core of
hypotheses  that  need  an  empirical  evaluation  with  great  potential  to  generate
advances in the understanding of the relation between functional diversity aspects
and ecosystem properties [SCIENTIST, personal communication].
 
Since the construction of a mechanistic model was the main goal of the model building, the  causal
reasoning tool  was,  unsurprisingly,  strongly  recognized  in  the  scientist’s  practice.  Beyond  the  causal
mechanistic  approach previously mentioned,  an example  of  causal  reasoning took place  when the  scientist
developed a schema to determine which system variables could be considered as information in the modeling
(Figure 4).
Figure 4: Diagram indicating steps for the recognition of relevant effect traits related to the pollination in a
system. An effect trait (1, 2, 3) will be relevant if, and only if, its exclusion implicates changes in the deposition
of grains of pollen on the stigma. This will consequently reduce the amount of fruits and/or seeds of the target
plant species, which will deviate from the maximum potential of the species. This constraining effect of the
effect trait on the reproductive success of the plant should guide the selection of relevant traits in the analysis.
Source: Coutinho (2018). 
According to the modeler statement, “In the first proposition of the mechanism sketch I realized that I
could not arrive at a minimally reasonable scheme of communication of my phenomenon, and of the relevant
variables for such”. “Scheme of communication” can be read precisely as a means of developing a complete
mechanism that explicitly identifies the elements and causal relations of the system. Such a reading enables us
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to make inferences about what Machamer et al. (2000) call productive continuity. The continuity for Machamer
et al. concerns the causal relations between the elements of a mechanism that enable it to produce an event or
byproduct (i.e. the phenomenon) and can be easily tracked as a conceptual tool. In our case study, the modeler
was not able to identify such productive continuity in the first sketches due to several gaps that existed in the
ecological literature. The completion of such black and gray boxes was only possible due to his knowledge of
mainstream ecological literature. During this occurrence, the understanding of his phenomenon was becoming
more apparent, as expressed in the scientist’s more detailed schema. Ultimately, causal reasoning led him to
understanding because it revealed what he took to be the underlying structure of the world:
[…] I cannot construct a conceptual model if I do not know the set of variables and
conditions of interaction between these variables that are relevant in the proposition
of this model. This does not mean that we should be able to begin the proposition of
the model by knowing all the relevant variables - this would take away one of the
great virtues of the art of modeling: a gradual refining of our theoretical constructs
about  the  functioning  of  the  world.  This  heuristics  [enabling  conditions]  is  the
backbone  of  this  work  since  it  allows  a  constant  search  in  the  literature  for
ecological  variables  (drivers)  of  paramount  importance  in  explaining  the
phenomenon  and  its  zones  of  intersection  and  influence.  [...]  This  heuristics
"opened my mind" to a more critical view in the ecological literature, searching for
variables of paramount importance for the proposition of the model (SCIENTIST,
personal communication)
Grasping  the  productive  continuity  of  the  mechanisms  allowed  the  scientist  to  explore  alternative
scenarios  and  predict  possible  paths  of  the  system  under  investigation  (Figure  5).  This  was  achieved  by
modifying some of the enabling conditions. Such research practice is acknowledged by Leonelli (2009, p. 192)
that “explanation in biology is always obtained through direct intervention on models of the phenomenon to be
explained”.  In harmony with, Figure 4 exposes two alternative scenarios that  the modeler developed while
considering elements of the metacommunity theories as enabling conditions, capable of providing the necessary
conditions for the mechanism’s productive continuity. Left, combination of species sorting and patch dynamics.
In this layout the patches are well connected and present high structural complexity of the vegetation. In this
case, the agricultural activity has been recently introduced into the system, there is no vegetation suppression.
Hence, there is  a high supply of resources for pollination.  Right,  combination of species sorting with mass
effect. There is a predominance of agriculture at the scale of the landscape and the remnant patches will serve as
strongholds for small bees. The extinction of landscape will act as a filter for the dispersion of bees. At the local
scale, the structural characteristics that will select non-soil, oligolectic and small bees due to their response traits
will be maintained. The larger bees will be responsible for a large part of the pollen flow between patches,
increasing the chance of service stability at the meso- and macroscale. Some groups of crop plants will still
continue to be favorred by the presence of large bees.
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Figure 5: Two of >7 schemas developed to predict distinct ecological scenarios for the phenomenon. In each
figure,  the scientist  combined different scenarios according to  metacommunity theories.  Polygons represent
distinct  patches  with  different  dynamics;  arrows  represent  interactions  between  patches  and  dotted  lines
represent bees’ movements.
This activity allowed for the alteration of some system attributes (such as diversity traits), beyond those
usually proposed by empirical literature, allowing for the interaction with wider ecological  frameworks and
reflection upon a diversity of scenarios. This is in accordance with the contextual theory which states that causal
reasoning enhances the scientist’s ability to predict how systems will behave under particular conditions. In
Woodward’s (2003) account, scientific understanding can also be achieved by answering questions about the
behavior  of  the  system being investigated.  Even though there  are  different  standards  for  intelligibility,  the
contextual theory suggests the following criteria:
CIT: A scientific theory T (in one or more of its representations) is intelligible for
scientists  (in  context  C)  if  they  can  recognize  qualitatively  characteristic
consequences of T without performing exact calculations.
Scientific  explanation  in  the  ecological  realm  must  possess  a  predictive  nature  (explanatory  and
anticipatory) if it is to be of use in management. Predictions must be based on a theoretical framework (explicit
or implicit) that is decisive for its aims and limitations (on the absence of a theory, no prediction is possible).
Consequently, the understanding of processes responsible for the phenomena of interest not only helps in the
construction of explicative models, but also contributes to their predictive accuracy (Mouquet et al. 2015). This
assertion is aligned with one of the epistemic goals of science, namely prediction. In the contextual theory of
scientific understanding, the ability to predict, i.e. to recognize qualitative consequences of a theory, means that
the theories are intelligible to scientists. Thus, in this ecological case study, the understanding assessment also
fits  the  CIT.  One of  the  main  virtues  of  variations  in  terms  of  standards  of  intelligibility  is  that  one  can
accommodate the manifold ways in which understanding is achieved in scientific practice. According to this
notion, if scientists understand a theory, the theory is intelligible to them;which was exactly perceived in this
case study.
The unificationist conceptual tool brings an interesting aspect to a discussion about the biological field.
Biological sciences are extremely disunified, presenting a diversity of epistemic cultures (Leonelli 2009). The
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knowledge produced possesses various forms: mechanistic, causal reasoning, historical narrative, descriptive,
functional, mathematical, representational, and categorical (ibid. 2009). Since the nature of the data and the
methods of analysis are so diverse, it is not surprising that scientists try to solve this puzzle in a piecemeal
manner which is also what happened in the case study. In choosing which variable was the most significant to
model, the scientist created a table that included an incredible variety in the nature of data, all of which was
collected using different instruments and strategies, and therefore was analyzed accordingly (see Poliseli 2018).
The idea of this table was to gather information to recognize how they function in the pollination service in this
agricultural system. In addition, an effort was made to combine different theoretical propositions, as stated:
[…] It is no novelty that ecological phenomena are hierarchical and that there are
several levels of interaction between scales in the hierarchy, which may be spatial,
temporal  or  spatiotemporal.  This  heuristics  [hierarchical  structure]  was  applied
when I understood the potential that two metacommunity models could help me in
proposing  our  conceptual  model.  I  realized  here  that  both  could  make  great
contributions, provided I used the most appropriate scale in using the forecasts of
each  of  these  models.  THEY  COULD  BE  COMPLEMENTARY  IN  THE
EXPLANATION OF THE PHENOMENON. It  was here that  I  realized that  the
discourse  of  plurality  in  scientific  explanation  was  fully  consistent  with  my
phenomenon:  it  was  all  a  matter  of  scale  […]  [SCIENTIST,  personal
communication, emphasis added by the modeler].
It  is  undeniable  that  unification  played  a  major  role  in  the  development  of  explanation  and  model
construction.  Nonetheless,  its  epistemic  role  was  not  only limited  to  the  empirical  approach  regarding the
diversity of data nature.  It  also embraced the theoretical  scope employed by the scientist.  For instance, the
conceptual  framework  developed was  mainly scaffolded  according to  three  distinct  theories  from different
domains, i.e., mechanistic explanation, complex systems science and metacommunity theories.
It  is also possible to associate these activities with the types of understanding suggested by Gijsbers
(2013). According to Gijsbers, there are at least two types of understanding. The first type of understanding
would  be  achieved  according  to  the  scientist’s  acknowledgment  of  the  phenomenon’s  causal  relations
(explanation-understanding or vertical connections). The second type would be achieved based on the scientist’s
knowledge of the phenomena’s unification aspects (unification-understanding or horizontal connections). There
is enough evidence in this case study to assert that these two types of understanding occurred, however, it is not
possible to agree they took place in this specific order,  viewed that the scientist’s activities were occurring
concomitantly.  The  only  certainty  about  this  practice  is  that  the  knowledge  concerning  the  phenomenon
gradually increased according to its complexity and the need to elaborate more complex explanations. However,
this does not mean that his understanding through unification only occurred later on. This is acknowledged by
Khalifa and Gadomski (2013) when they assert that the causaland the unificationist models are appropriate for
different contexts and therefore require a plurality of explanatory relations. These activities were so intricately
related to each other that even the possibility of a distinct  separation was merely viable for the theoretical
purposes of trying to bring order to a somewhat chaotic endeavor.
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This section revealed that de Regt's (2017) contextual theory provides us with normative tools to assess
scientific understanding. This theory is indeed sensitive to the context, as it can be applied both to historical case
studies in physics as well as to current ecological research practice. However, it seems that this theory is still
bound to explanatory strategies (see Knuuttila and Merz 2009) regardless of efforts to add a psychological
aspect  to  it.  Qualitative  scenarios  and  intuitive  judgment  are  not  enough  to  explain  the  emergence  of
understanding, which also relies upon psychological  and cognitive aspects. This lack indicates the need for
future investigations. For instance, how does understanding emerge in distinct domains of knowledge? What
exactly are qualitative predictive scenarios and how are they developed? How does intuitive judgment behave?
The following section will contribute to these debates by answering how does understanding emerge? 
5. The emergence of scientific understanding in ongoing ecological research practice
This section argues that the ecological case study suggests a remarkable account of the formation of
scientific understanding in current research processes. Recall that the methodological innovation of this article is
to  address  the  formation  of  scientific  understanding  in  an  ongoing  research  project  through  in-depth
ethnographic research. Figure 6 provides a unique account of how scientific understanding emerges in real-time
scientific practice by providing empirical evidence for debates that are long-time theoretical. The general idea of
this model is that scientific understanding was achieved through two distinct stages: first, it relied upon the
scientist’s basic skills, in here considered as background knowledge and abilities; and secondly, through the use
of imagination. One interesting aspect exposed by this model is that both forms of understanding provided a
reliable source of knowledge for subsequent scientific and ecological activities, suggesting a role of knowledge
selectivity. Some core tenets of this process, such as stages of understanding, imagination, and selectivity feature
will be addressed in following subsections.
Figure 6: Model representing the emergence of scientific understanding in current ecological research practice.
Note the different ways that lead to understanding, in other words, degrees of understanding are reached through
the gradual development of skills and imagination. Full arrows represent direct relations between the boxes.
Dotted arrows represent feedback relations between the boxes. Colored arrows suggest distinct stages of the
process of emergence of scientific understanding (explanation vide text).
5.1. Emergence of understanding and its relation to stages of understanding
15
The idea that understanding occurs in degrees is widely acknowledged (Kvanvig 2003). Nonetheless it
often remains unclear how these degrees develop and how they should be assessed. The most common idea
asserts that the more detailed the knowledge, the deeper the understanding. Take for example this sentence:
“degrees of understanding simply correspond to different amounts of knowledge. An agent understands better
why p in so far as she knows more about  why p” (Sliwa 2015, p. 71). This section will reveal, among other
things, that degrees of understanding do not reduce to the amount of knowledge as defined by Sliwa (2015).
Instead, understanding is intimately related to an agent’s ability to interact with the information received and the
complexity of this information (Section 5.3). To avoid confusion, in this context, degrees of understanding refer
to gradual stages of understanding, and are intrinsically related to the complexity of the information. I will
developed this idea. 
Before I explain the Figure 6 model, it is important to consider that biologists ought to exercise specific
epistemic skills in order to materially intervene on and reason about the world (Leonelli 2009, p. 190). Epistemic
skills can be defined as    
[…]  the  abilities  to  carry out  a  number  of  activities  in  order  to  increase  one's
understanding of reality. They may be partly innate, such as the skill of drawing an
object (which depends to some degree on the talent of the individual attempting
such action), yet they are most often acquired  through the imitation of others and/or
through experience, for instance by trial or error. […] the notion of skill concerns
also the means and manners by which action is undertaken (ibid 2009, p. 2000).  
In the case of scientific research, epistemic skills can be distinguished in theoretical skills, performative
skills,  and social  skills  (ibid).  Theoretical  skills  relate to the capacity to manipulate various expressions of
theoretical knowledge (i.e. abstract models, theories, concepts). Performative skills are acquired only through
practice,  through  the  direct  interaction  with  the  environment,  and  enables  the  scientist  to  exploit  material
resources such as laboratory equipment, specimens, and so on. And, social skills is the ability of researchers to
conform to existing social standards (e.g. the ability to engage with research and express their works according
to a given research community) (for more details see Leonelli 2009). Considering the Figure 6 model, one of the
propositions defended here is that  the understanding achieved in the ecological  case study emerged from a
gradual  process.  At all  stages  of  understanding,  the  scientist  (S)  is  considered  as  an  epistemic  agent  who
possesses  highly technical  skills  coupled  with  a  theoretical  background that  enables  him to  make reliable
decisions about his object of study. Thus, epistemic skills here relates to theoretical skills and performative skills
only.  Once  it  is  assumed  that  knowledge  can  be  understood  in  terms  of  successful  action  plus  warrant
(Williamson 2000; Hawley 2003), these become important features. 
At  the  first  stage  of  understanding (Figure  6,  full  blue  arrow),  the  scientist’s  epistemic  skills  were
sufficient for him to achieve understanding of the phenomenon (upper full blue arrow). This became possible
once it is assumed that non-explanatory information can form the basis for understanding (e.g. Lipton 2009;
Gijsbers 2013; Kelp 2015; de Regt and Gijsbergs 2016). Therefore, these abilities worked as mediators, which
allowed the scientist to gain understanding by means of expertise and technical effort. In science, it might be the
case that the understanding achieved at this stage was also a final product, but in this model it is represented as a
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first stage of understanding. For instance, if the ecologist’s final goal was to explain his phenomenon by means
of a simple diagram, he would have reached understanding with his first sketch (Figure 2). However this was
not the case. While developing mechanisms sketches, the modeler perceived theoretical gaps in the literature,
which required completion (see Section 4.1). Connecting with this Section’s model, this allowed the scientist to
proceed to a second stage of understanding. 
The understanding that emerged in the first stage scaffolds knowledge and expertise that will be further
used in analyses and experiments,  resulting in an epistemic improvement of the scientist’s skills (Figure 6,
dotted blue arrow). As a result, the scientist is prepared for a next stage of understanding.  Based on the case
study,  this  can  be  exemplified  by the  several  definitions of  explanans and  explanandum developed by the
scientist  during his research. Initially,  explanandum was defined simply as the “diversity patterns  of  insect
pollinator  in  agricultural  systems”.  A second  characterization  sought  to  narrow down the  phenomenon  by
selecting a category of pollinator and a specific type of diversity: “functional composition of autochthonous bee
communities  in  agricultural  systems”.  A third  definition  was  related  to  a  specific  agricultural  system  and
ecosystem service: “the functional structure of an autochthonous bee community, as well as the maintenance of
its pollination services in an agricultural  system”. For each new definition, new elements were gathered or
excluded in order to help the scientist understand the system being modeled. What can be learned from this case
is that, the gradual improvement of the delimitation of the system being investigated reflected its amount of
complexity.  This  model  thus  illustrates  how  scientific  understanding  is  transient.  Once  again,  theoretical
knowledge and technical expertise (combined into skills) allowed the scientist to understand his phenomenon. 
It  is  worthy  to  note  that  these  different  stages  dos  not  necessarily  relate  to  different  types  of
understanding.  For  instance,  in  biological  practices  Leonelli  (2009)  suggests  three  types  of  understanding:
theoretical understanding, embodied understanding, and integrated understanding.  Theoretical  understanding
concerns  the  understanding  of  biological  phenomena  that  is  achieved  “through  recourse  to  theoretical
commitments and skills, with performative skills and commitment playing a subsidiary role” (ibid,  p. 204).
Embodied understanding uses theoretical skills and commitment to develop performative skills with the goal to
interact and intervene in the phenomenon (theoretical commitment having a subsidiary role). And,  integrated
understanding is  a  balanced interaction between theoretical  and embodied knowledge.  While it  would feel
prompt to associate theoretical knowledge to the first stage, embodied understanding to the second stage, and
the overall process to an integrative understanding; this is not necessarily assumed in this case study. One of the
reasons why Figure 6 model does not account for distinct types of understanding is because it might be possible
that theoretical, embodied and integrative understanding occur at any stage of the process. Once the scientific
practice is not assumed as a linear process, such stages will not necessarily follow a sequence, instead, it will
occur according to a given research goal (see Section 5.3).
5.2. Emergence of understanding and its relation to imagination
There  are  several  strategies  through  which  scientists  can  recognize  qualitative  characteristics
consequences of T without performing exact calculations (de Regt 2017). Considering that S is not always in a
position to causally interact with the phenomenon (Ylikoski 2009), abilities (developed in previous stage of the
model) qualify  S to consider the phenomenon in a way in which laboratory instruments aren’t  required for
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analysis. These strategies are products of mental activities, named “imagination” or “imaginative processes” and
are key features to the emergence of understanding (Figure 6, green arrows). This imagination will act basically
through  intuitive  judgment  and  thought  experiments,  producing  counterfactual  scenarios  that  will  provide
‘qualitative consequences of T’. I will elaborate.
To connect the contextual theory with the aspect of imagination, recall that:
 
[…] skill  and intuitive judgment play a central  role in the process of achieving
scientific understanding. If a theory is intelligible to scientists because its theoretical
qualities match their skills, they can reason “intuitively” with it. Like our everyday
intuitive skills, scientists’ skills are the outcome of a complex learning process in
which their  evolved cognitive capacities  interact  with the environment  in  which
they find themselves (that is, the historical and disciplinary context of their science)
(de Regt 2017, p. 110).
 
According to de Regt (2009, 2017), skills and judgment cannot be reduced to rule-following procedures
because they change according to the historical, social or disciplinary context. Such skills will depend on a
scientist’s given theory and its pragmatic virtues. For instance, a model’s construction relies upon a specific
theoretical framework that demands the modeler possess specific skills concerning its theoretical properties.
Such  skills  may vary  from  expertise  techniques  (e.g. lab  work,  data  collection)  to  grasping  and  intuitive
judgment.
De Regt (2017) elaborates upon Gigerenzer’s (2007) psychological notion of intuitive judgment, which
instead of viewing intuitive judgments as obscure, sees them as being produced by heuristics that are usually
developed during an evolutionary process of adaptation to the environment. Gigerenzer (ibid) acknowledges the
reliability of intuitions and their role in decision-making processes. He defines intuition as judgment that arises
immediately in consciousness without full awareness of underlying causes (for contrary views see Kahneman
2011). 
The intuitive judgment referred to here acts through mental action that enables the modeler to assess
counterexamples. This mental action only occurs due to the capability of imaginative processes. Imagination or
imaginative processes are fundamental higher mental actions that may also occur through thought experiments,
metaphors and utopias (Tateo 2016, 2020). One type of thought experiment is anticipatory understanding. In
anticipatory understanding, when causal interaction with an object is not possible, relevant inferences may be
made about future consequences of some event or series of events regarding the explanandum (Ylikoski 2009).
Counterfactual  situations  offer  predictions  of  the  phenomenon  without  causal  intervention.  They do  so  by
creating ‘internal mental models’ (Waskan 2006) that suffer the judgment of intuition, which is consonant with
the criterion for the intelligibility of a theory at the contextual theory of scientific understanding. With respect to
the ecological case study, the counterfactual scenarios elaborated by  S  were reflected through the heuristics
‘change in the operational distinction’. In this heuristics, S developed internal mental models capable of creating
counterfactual scenarios that then became the external models represented in Figure 5. It is worthwhile to state
that success under certain counterfactual circumstances is a necessary condition for knowledge (Hawley 2003). 
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In this sense, anticipatory understanding is considered here as a type of thought experiment, and more
specifically,  as  a  counterfactual  thought  experiment.  As  with  any  thought  experiment,  it  deliberately  and
purposively appeals to imagination (de Mey 2006). In order to avoid a slippery notion, it  has be used with
caution  (Hawthorne  1991),  manipulating  one  factor  at  time  (de  Mey  2006).  In  this  manner,  anticipatory
understanding can be a powerful tool. For instance, reasoning processes of thought experiments should involve
the construal of weighed explanations that happen in two steps: contrast and counterfactuals. The idea of weight
is used to determine whether one cause of the phenomenon is more important than another. Thus, the contrast
specifies a situation in which the explanandum is compared to mental scenarios, which then drastically reduces
the number of possible causes for the following counterfactual reasoning (de Mey 2006). Statements such as
those below contribute to the idea that counterfactual thought experiments were indeed used by the scientist as
scaffolding to achieve understanding of the phenomenon:
 
The  heuristics  [elaboration  of  mechanism  sketch]  has  awakened  me  to  this
theoretical gap that existed in me in relation to the phenomenon that I have studied.
With  each  new  sketch,  new  challenges,  and  solutions,  two  dimensions  of  the
process of construction of scientific knowledge that led me to lead a process of full
immersion  in  the  scientific  literature  to  address  the  gaps  that  were  gradually
perceived.  Each  new  reading  enables  me  to  review  my  sketches  (often  not
materialized,  but  purely  mental),  and  I  will  reaffirm  my understanding  of  my
phenomenon  and  the  potential  contributions  that  this  research  can  provide
[SCIENTIST, personal communication]
 
Considering the ability of humans to mentally account for real and imagined situations as well as the
predictive power of thought, internal mental models can be structural, behavioral, or functional analogues to
real-world phenomena (Craik 1943). In this sense, mental models are constructed to be reasoned with (Thagard
2010). They can therefore be useful in providing explanations (Johnson-Laird 1980, 1983), as explicitly noted in
the modeler’s statement above. This is clearly apparent in the case study where the scientist combined species
sorting with mass effect principles to develop predictive scenarios, as discussed in the previous section. The
explicit intent was to suggest adjustments to some elements of the phenomenon in order to predict possible
modifications in the system under investigation. 
Another example of mental accounts was the modification of the heuristics role during the scientific
practice. Table 1 reveals the epistemic role of some main heuristics as empirical activities. These heuristics were
developed at the beginning of the ecologist’s research undertaken with the philosopher. When considering Table
2 together with the content created by the modeler at the end of this research practice, the modification of the
heuristics  from empirical  activities  to  mental  activities  is  explicitly apparent.  Instead  of  actions,  they have
become questions to be answered. 
Table 2: Contribution of each heuristics in the construction of the ecologist’s theoretical 





What do we want to explain/predict? What are the boundaries of our 
question of interest?
Mechanism sketch How do we communicate our framework in a clear and intelligible way?
Hierarchical 
structure
How many, and which, hierarchical levels are most relevant to 




Which, if any, response variables and predictors be synthesized into more 
ecologically relevant components? 
Source: Poliseli (2018).
The development  of  external  models,  represented in  Figure 5,  clearly shows internal  mental  models
undergoing modification to become external models. While complementing the idea that successful scientific
cognition combines  internal  representations with external  representations,  there  is  an  important  distinction:
internal mental models are not understanding (Ylikoski 2009). Rather, as mediators, they enable the formation
of understanding, which subsequently allows one to reach a second level of understanding (Figure 6, green
arrows).
5.3. Emergence of understanding and its relation to knowledge selectivity
Once understanding was achieved, it transformed itself once more into knowledge that served as a basis
for theoretical expertise, skills and imagination (Figure 6, orange arrows), supporting the idea of an ephemeral
and transient character of understanding. Such a dynamic allows the modeler to improve his skills and to further
develop increasingly complex counterexamples. However, it is important to note that the gradually improved
ability to understand complex phenomenon does not mean that scientific understanding is akin to cumulative
process,  an  ad  infinitum addition  of  information  from  one  level  to  another.  On  the  contrary,  scientific
understanding is also a  selective and refinement process of information gathered. It’s important to recall that
intelligibility  enables  scientists  to  use  theories  in  order  to  generate  explanations  and  predictions.  Being
intelligible is a context-dependent feature related to the scientist’s skill  and theoretical  virtues (de Regt and
Dieks 2005). In this sense, scientific understanding is value-laden because it can be grounded in the idea that
human developmental  processes,  such as learning, creating, planning, imagining, building, problem-solving,
inventing, etc., can lead to both generative and destructive outcomes (see Tateo 2016). As seen in the case study,
the  scientist  was  capable  of  choosing  between  diagrams,  theories,  and  models  that  best  fit  his  conceptual
framework.
Looking at Figure 6 model, some questions arise: how many levels of understanding are possible? If
scientific understanding occurs in degrees, is there a higher or greater understanding that can be achieved? Do
the different standards of intelligibility suggest different standards of scientific understanding? The existence of
degrees  of  understanding  is  consistent  with  the  idea  of  different  standards  of  intelligibility.  However,  the
existence of degrees of understanding, and therefore, degrees of intelligibility, does not mean that degrees will
occur  in  every  scientific  practice.  Considering  that  scientific  practice  concerns  explanation  or  model
construction, and that the achievement of understanding is content- and context-related, the number of stages
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might be connected to the explanandum. The more complex a phenomenon being studied, the more degrees of
understanding and intelligibility may occur.
An  important  difference  between  understanding  and  scientific  understanding,  which  might  appear
tautological, but it  is useful  to recall, is that the  latter is tacitly immersed in a scientific context where the
practices of a scientific community operate: “understanding can only be qualified as “scientific” when obtained
through the skillful and consistent use of tools, instruments, methods, theories, and/or models” (Leonelli 2009,
p. 190). Thus, any level of understanding will be intrinsically related to a given research goal. As such, there is
no greater or higher understanding, only the understanding that is supposed to be achieved according to  S’s
investigation. Undoubtedly, there will be some kind of increase in complexity, once the understanding in one
stage is embodied, becoming expertise and skills for future stages. This is aligned with Leonelli (2009, p. 199)
that “in the case of biological understanding, the quality of the understanding displayed by a researcher will
depend  on  his  or  her  acquisition  of  appropriate  background  knowledge  as  well  as  expertise  in  handling
instruments,  models,  and  theories  that  make  it  possible  to  produce  and  apply any  scientific  explanation”.
However, this does not preclude the possibility that the so-called second stage takes place before the so-called
first stage. The same takes place with kinds of understanding, as discussed in Section 5.1. The model should,
therefore, not be seen as an oversimplified linear event but also as proposing an account of a waterfall or spiral
phenomenon product of a creative thinking process (see Boehm 1988; Ebert 1994; Gupta and Bhatia 2012). 
This section discussed how the emergence of scientific understanding takes place in ongoing research
practice.  By  representing  this  emergence  through  a  model,  main  features  pertaining  to  the  formation  of
understanding  was  explored,  i.e. the  use  of  skills  and  imaginative  processes.  The  ethnographic  evidence
presented provided sufficient  information to sustain that  scientific understanding can be gradually achieved
through different stages. In this case study, two stages were recognized. Important aspects of this process are its
knowledge selectivity and refinement feature. After each stage, understanding assigns reliable knowledge for
subsequent  scientific  and  ecological  activities.  This  also  suggests  that  in  order  to  achieve  scientific
understanding,  one needs to have at  least  a  minimum amount  of  scientific  knowledge,  in other  words,  the
information thought to contribute to understanding must be accessible to the epistemic agent (de Regt 2017). 
Despite the contextual theory’s normative character and its applicability to current case studies, it seems
that  de  Regt's  (2017)  latest  version  of  the  contextual  theory  cannot  sufficiently  explain  how  scientific
understanding actually emerges. Such a conclusion supports the claim of this article that historical case studies
may only tell one part of the story. The other part may very well be written through the use of ethnographic tools
to access and assess real-life case studies in the attempt to reach domains beyond those tied to ready-made
explanations.
6. Conclusion
The aim of this article has been to develop an account of the gradual emergence of scientific understanding in an
ongoing ecological  research practice.  While de Regt (2017) contextual  theory of scientific understanding is
based on careful case studies of scientific practice, much of the debate has been shaped by historical examples
that provide only limited information with respect to cognitive processes and other details related to constructing
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and revising models in practice. The methodological innovation of this study has been to combine the contextual
theory with ethnographic research of an ongoing research process and to address the formation of understanding
through an analysis of evidence gathered through empirical case study (see also Leonelli 2009).
The outcomes of this investigation are twofold. First, the case study validates core assumptions of the
contextual theory. It confirmed the crucial role of visualization in scientific understanding by tracing how the
construction and revision of visual sketches guided the development of models and theories. Secondly, the case
study’s results enabled the development of a model tracing the emergence of scientific understanding in current
research practices. These outcomes complement discussions surrounding the nature of understanding, as seen
through a fine-grained analysis of the process of scientific understanding, which is a result of the formation of
epistemic skills  and imaginations that  are iteratively transformed in current  research practice of model  and
theory construction. While acknowledgeding the absecense of several information pertaining to each box of the
model (i.e. skills, imagination), future empirical investigation is required. The model’s overall simplicity does
not do justice to the complexity of its achievement. Nevertheless, this simplification is a starting point for a
reconstruction of scientific understanding through empirical evidence of case studies.  Further research is still
necessary to test  whether  the Figure 6 model  can guide philosophical  analysis  regarding the emergence of
understanding in other cases of current scientific practices, and how the emergence of understanding relates to
types of understanding. 
To conclude,  a core feature of this study is its  qualitative ethnographic method, based on long-term
collaboration with a  researcher  in  ecology.  This  method has  important  strengths  in  facilitating an  in-depth
analysis of the formation of understanding in a complex real-life case and providing a nuanced picture of the
function of tools such as the visual sketches discussed in Section 4. At the same time, reliance on one particular
case  study necessarily makes  the  generalization  of  Section  5  hypothetical.  Even though this  model’s  very
specific context makes it difficult to claim generality (see Levin 1992), historians and philosophers of science
that propose general hypotheses of how science works, usually rely on case studies (Bishop and Trout 2002). To
quote Mizrahi (forthcoming, p. 10), “Since philosophy of science is about science, by definition, it means that
philosophers of science tend to argue for meta-scientific conclusions [that] are general in nature”, thus, case
studies of ongoing scientific research might as well be used as evidence for meta-scientific conclusions that are
supposed to apply to science as a whole. 
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